We study dynamic bargaining with private information and a deadline. As commitment power disappears, there is a clear "deadline e¤ect" that is, trade takes place smoothly before the deadline and with an atom right at the deadline. Prices, timing of trade and the deadline e¤ect respond to the consequences of not reaching an agreement. Bleaker disagreement options lead to more trade and proportionally more of the agreements taking place in the verge of the deadline. Time to deadline can a¤ect the overall e¢ ciency of the equilibrium non-monotonically. For intermediate deadlines, e¢ ciency is improved if agents face bleaker prospects after deadline.
Introduction
In this paper we study dynamic bargaining with private information in the presence of a deadline. Many negotiations have a preset deadline by which an agreement must be reached.
For example, with a known trial date looming ahead, parties engage in pretrial negotiations.
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Financial considerations might also act as an e¤ective deadline. Countries that have large debt repayments ahead of them bargain with international agencies such as the IMF for …nancing that would help them avoid default. 1 Private companies also face re…nancing deadlines or deadlines to obtain …nancing in order to be able to invest in a given venture.
Finally, negotiations can be a¤ected by regulatory deadlines. For example, to take advantage of the home buyer credit program, buyers and sellers of homes had to close their transactions by a given deadline to qualify for the subsidy.
Empirical literature has documented that a large fraction of agreements are reached in the "eleventh hour" that is at or very close to the deadline. For example, Cramton and Tracy (1992) study a sample of 5002 labor contract negotiations involving large bargaining units and they claim a "clear 'deadline e¤ect' exists in the data" since 31% of agreements are reached on the deadline. 2 Williams (1983) in a sample of civil cases from Arizona has found that 70% of the cases were settled in the last 30 days before trial and 13% were settled on the day of the trial. Such strong deadline e¤ects have been also observed in experimental studies (see for example Roth, Murnighan and Schoumaker (1988) ).
What determines whether parties will reach an agreement before the deadline, at the deadline (on the morning of the trial date or in the wee hours of the night before the labor contract expires) or not at all? How do post-deadline payo¤s a¤ect the division of surplus and the timing of agreement? What else a¤ects these two key aspects of the dynamic outcomes?
We answer these questions in a model of bargaining with a deadline based on a classic paper by Sobel and Takahashi (1983) (henceforth ST). 3 In the model a seller makes an o¤er that can be either accepted or refused. If rejected, the process continues until a deadline is reached. The buyer has private information about the value of the good for sale (i.e. we have one-sided private information). Both parties prefer earlier trade, this is modeled via impatience (discounting costs) to realize the surplus from trade.
We add to the ST model in two ways. First, ST consider only the case that if trade does not take place by the deadline, the trade opportunity and all surplus is lost. Since we are interested in how post-deadline outcomes a¤ect the size of the deadline e¤ect and the division of surplus, in our model the amount of remaining surplus and its split after the deadline is 1 For example, the current negotiations between Greece the EU and IMF are carried under the looming re…nancing needs due to loans maturing." Greece must re…nance 54 billion euros in debt in 2010, with a crunch in the second quarter as more than 20 billion euros becomes due." http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63F2ZR20100416 2 They interpret agreements reached even a day after the contract expiration as reached "on" the deadline. 3 There are other bargaining models with deadlines but they are quite di¤erent. See for example Ma and Manove (1993) and Fershtman and Seidman (1993) . the key variable in our model. 4 Second, more technically, we take the non-commitment limit (i.e. taking the time between periods to zero) and show that the limit of equilibria is very simple. Moreover, it allows for a clear de…nition of the "deadline e¤ect" as in the limit there is smooth trade (probability ‡ow) before the deadline and an atom (probability mass) of trade at the deadline. 5 Moreover, prices in the limit have a natural economic interpretation related to the Coase conjecture intuition (despite trade being ine¢ cient). The tractability of the continuous-time limit is somewhat unexpected because non-stationary models (not only beliefs evolve over time but also time till the deadline changes) are usually much more di¢ cult to analyze (as can be seen in discrete time by comparing ST to Stokey (1981) and Bulow (1982) GSW) . 6 In such games, the seller becomes more and more pessimistic over time (higher types trade sooner than lower types) and asks for lower and lower prices. The famous Coase conjecture result is that without a deadline, as commitment disappears, the seller reduces its prices faster and faster and in the limit trade is e¢ cient (no delay). We show that deadlines dramatically change the outcomes. A deadline provides the seller with a lower payo¤ bound that she can achieve by making unacceptable o¤ers until the deadline. Our …rst main result (Proposition 2) is that as commitment disappears, the seller's equilibrium payo¤ converges to this lower bound: she obtains a payo¤ equal to the outside option of just waiting for the deadline. However, trade and prices do not converge to the standard Coase conjecture outcome (immediate trade and all types trading at one price) or the outside option (trade only at the deadline), but rather in the limit trade happens gradually over time. The price paid by each type is equal to the discounted price that this type would pay at the deadline if the seller adopted from now on the wait-till-deadline strategy. This property of prices is important to satisfy equilibrium conditions: if prices were higher, the seller would like to speed up trade; if they were lower, she would prefer to wait for the deadline. Finally, the 4 Admittedly, each of the bargaining environments provided as examples above has idiosyncratic and potentially important details that would a¤ect the way negotiations are carried forward. Our model abstracts from many of those details, yet it is rich enough to capture the e¤ect of deadlines and the consequence of not reaching an agreement on the bargaining outcome. The disagreement payo¤ can also be thought of as the expected payo¤s the agents would get from the continuation game that would start at T + 1: For example, if the private information is revealed at T + 1 (possibly at some cost) and then the players bargain with full information. 5 Away from the limit there is a mass of trade in each period and hence the "deadline e¤ect" is less evident. 6 See Ausubel, Cramton, and Deneckere (2001) for a survey of the literature.
speed at which equilibrium prices drop over time (which is one-to-one related to the speed at which the seller screens the types) assures that no buyer type wants to delay or speed up trade.
Once the deadline is reached and the last take it or leave it o¤er is made, there is a large probability it is accepted but there is also the possibility that the o¤er is not accepted. In that case, the players get their disagreement payo¤s. Cramton and Tracy (1992) A second comparative static result is that bleaker prospects from disagreement lead to more of the agreements taking place on the 'eleventh hour'. That is, although there is more agreement, most of it is concentrated at the deadline. That prediction, that lower disagreement payo¤s not only increase the chances of compromise but also make the deadline 7 Our model should be interpreted as capturing the labor negotiations before the end of the current contractual agreement or the preset strike date. e¤ect more pronounced, while consistent with the anecdotes we discussed above, provides a good empirical test of the theory.
The last comparative static result we want to highlight is how the overall e¢ ciency of the equilibrium varies with the parameters of the model. First, we show that for intermediate deadlines, the ex-ante expected e¢ ciency can be higher if passing the deadline is very costly to the parties -those swords of Damocles can play a positive role ex-ante. Second, especially if the past-deadline ine¢ ciency is small, the e¢ ciency can be non-monotone in the time to deadline: high for short and very long deadlines but smaller for intermediate ones. Finally, unlike in the standard Coase conjecture literature without deadlines, it is sometimes the case that if the seller had the commitment power to stick to its …rst o¤er until the deadline, the overall e¢ ciency would be higher than in the non-commitment limit (it happens when the deadline is not too long).
Two other papers considered the continuous-time limit of the ST model in case the opportunity of trade disappears at the deadline. Guth and Ritzberger (1998) studied the case of a uniform distribution and have shown that in the non-commitment limit the seller's value converges to what she can attain from waiting for the last period. 8 Ausubel and Deneckere (1992) considered the richer class of distributions that we study and observed that prices converge to the discounted monopolist price (see footnote 38 in their paper). Relatively to these, the main contribution of our paper is that we study the determinants of the deadline e¤ect, a topic not addressed in these papers.
A closely related paper to ours is Hart (1989) . That paper studies a model similar to ours to try to explain duration of strikes and labor disputes. In that model there is also an exogenous deadline T after which the …rm is facing a "crunch". The main di¤erence from our paper is the way the crunch is modeled: we assume that at T some of the value of the …rm is lost -for example, because if the …rm does not resolve the dispute by T; a major supplier is lost. In Hart (1989) at T the discounting increases. That leads to a major di¤erence: in a model like Hart (1989) as the commitment to make o¤ers disappears, disputes are again resolved immediately and e¢ ciently; in a model with a discrete cost at T; ine¢ cient delay persists even in the non-commitment limit. 9 Spier (1992) studies a model of pretrial negotiations and her section with exogenous deadlines is also relevant to our paper. The main di¤erence from our model is that the social cost of delay is independent of type because legal costs are independent of the type of the 8 They also show the Coase conjecture result in case the deadline goes to in…nity and allow the traders to have di¤erent discount rates. 9 To avoid the Coase conjecture, Hart (1989) explicitly focuses on the discrete time model. defendant. Our model applies to pre-trial negotiations if the defendant's legal costs are proportional to his type. That would be the case, for example, if the plainti¤ would restrict a use of an asset (a patent or a real estate) until the dispute is resolved. Similarly, the defendant may not be able to sell an asset or secure outside investment until the case is over (and the deadline may represent a loss of such outside opportunity). 10 The di¤erence in results is that in Spier (1992) o¤ers are increasing over time while in our model they are decreasing (although in both models the distribution gets weaker over time). Also, we get a unique equilibrium in which each buyer type has a uniquely optimal time to trade. In her model there are multiple equilibria and all defendant types that settle are completely indi¤erent over the time to settle. The similarity is that both models can deliver a deadline e¤ect (however, in case of a binary distribution Spier (1992) obtains a U-shaped distribution of agreement times, while in our model there is no atom at t = 0).
Cramton and Tracy (1992) construct a more detailed model of wage bargaining. They seek to explain why in many instances when contracts are not renegotiated in time, unions choose to continue working under the old contract instead of starting a strike. This is referred to as a holdout. They assume a holdout is ine¢ cient (for example, as a result of working to rule). Their model starts with the old contract already expired and the choice of the unions of what regime they want to be in while they continue negotiating. Our model should rather be interpreted as capturing the negotiation before the old contract expires. The ex-post choice of threat by the union would still be relevant in our model since it would a¤ect the disagreement payo¤s which could be modeled as arising from the game described in Cramton and Tracy (1992) . In this sense, we see our paper as complementary to theirs since it allows determining when the …rm would reach a holdout.
In recent work, Hörner and Samuelson (2011) consider the case in which there are no costs of delaying trade until the deadline. Mapping a special case of their model to our environment, they show that with no discounting the seller makes unacceptable o¤ers until the last moment and then makes the monopolist o¤er. In contrast, we show that with discounting, which makes delay costly, all o¤ers are serious and trade takes place before the deadline with positive probability. With strict incentives for an early agreement, it is more surprising that a large fraction of the trades are delayed until the deadline. Moreover, the delay costs provide predictions about the relative probability of the agreement happening at the deadline or earlier.
On the more technical side, our paper is also related to bargaining models with interde-pendent valuations, as in Olsen (1992) and Deneckere and Liang (2006) . The reason is that although the buyer value is independent of seller cost, by trading today the seller gives up the option of trading at the deadline. That opportunity cost is correlated with the value of the buyer. The main di¤erence is that in our model the interdependence is created endogenously by the deadline and that the game is necessarily non-stationary.
The next section presents the general model and a characterization of the unique equilibrium of the game. Section 3 characterizes the limit of the equilibria as o¤ers can be revised continuously.
In Section 4 we then analyze how the deadline e¤ect and division of surplus depend on the disagreement payo¤s. Finally, Section 5 studies two benchmark cases. First we look at the case when the opportunity to trade and hence all surplus disappears at T:
Then we look at opposite case in which there is e¢ cient trade after reaching the deadline (for example following the release of the private information). In that sections we also discuss how overall e¢ ciency of the equilibrium depends on the deadline and other parameters of the model.
The Model
There is a seller (a she) and a buyer (a he). The seller has an indivisible good (or asset)
to sell. The buyer has a privately known type v 2 [0; 1] that represents his valuation of the asset. Types are distributed according to a c:d:f: F (v) = v a . 11 We denote its density by f (v). The seller's value of the asset is zero. 12 There is a total amount of time T < 1 for the parties to try to reach an agreement. The seller is able to commit to the current o¤er for a discrete period of length > 0: 13 The timing within periods is as follows. In the beginning of the period the seller makes a price o¤er p. The buyer then decides whether to accept or reject this price. If he accepts, the game ends. If he rejects, the game moves to the next period. 14 If time T is reached the game ends. 15 Seller's (behavioral) strategy at time t, denoted P (p t 1 ; T t; ) ; is a mapping from the histories of rejected prices, p t 1 ; and the remaining time, (T t) ; to the current period price o¤er, p t . Buyer's type v (behavioral) strategy at time t; denoted A v (p t ; T t; ) ; is a mapping from the history of prices (rejected plus current) and the remaining time, to a choice whether to accept or reject the current o¤er.
The payo¤s are as follows. If the game ends in disagreement the buyer gets a discounted payo¤ e rT v and the seller gets e rT v where r is the common discount rate. We assume ; 0 and + 1. For example, the case = = 0 represents that the opportunity to trade disappears after the deadline. This is the case analyzed by ST. In contrast, the case If the game ends with the buyer accepting price p at time t; then the seller's payo¤ is e rt p and the buyer's payo¤ is e rt (v p).
De…nition 1 A pair of strategies (P; ) constitutes a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game if they are mutual best responses after every history of the game. That requires:
1)Given the buyers'acceptance strategy every period (after every history) the seller chooses her current o¤er as to maximize her current expected discounted continuation payo¤.
2) For every history, given the seller's future o¤ers which would follow on the continuation equilibrium path induced by (P; ), the buyers' acceptance choice of the current o¤er is optimal.
Being a …nite horizon game, the equilibrium of the game can be solved by backward induction. As we show formally in the proof, with our distributional assumptions, given any period and any cuto¤ k induced by (P; ) and the history so far, the seller problem has a unique solution. Therefore, the continuation equilibrium is unique and depends on the history only via the induced cuto¤ and the remaining time, k and (T t) : That allows us to simplify notation: let the current equilibrium price be denoted by p = P (k; T t; ): Then the next period price is P ( (p; k; T t; ); T (t + ) ; ) and so on.
The equilibrium (P; ) induces a decreasing step function K (t; T t; ) which speci…es the highest remaining type in equilibrium as a function of time past and time remaining (with K(0; T ; ) = 1) and a decreasing step function (v; ) (with (1; ) = 0) which speci…es the time at which each type v trades (if it trades at all in equilibrium). For notational purposes, we let k + = (P (k; T t; ) ; k; T t; ) denote the highest remaining type at the beginning of the next period given current cuto¤ k and the strategies (P; ) :
Let V (k; T t; ) be the expected continuation payo¤ of the seller given a cuto¤ k with (T t) time left and the strategy pair ( ; P) : For t < T we can express V (k; T t; ) recursively as:
and for t = T we have:
For t < T; the seller's strategy is a best response to the buyer's strategy (p; t; ) if:
At t = T; the seller's strategy is a best response to the buyer's strategy (p; T ; ) if:
These best response problems capture the seller's lack of commitment: in every period she chooses the price to maximize her current value (instead of committing to a whole sequence of prices at time 0):
conditions for the buyer's strategy to be a best response is that given the expected path of prices the cuto¤s satisfy:
For t < T :
For t = T :
Following the proof strategy of Theorem 6 in ST we can establish the following result:
The game has a unique Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The equilibrium pricing function P (p t 1 ; T t; ) depends only on the history of past prices via the cuto¤ type k that they induce and it is linear in k: The seller's value V (k; T t; ) is also linear in k :
where:
19 They turn out to be also su¢ cient.
and for t < T
The proof is by induction and is delegated to the appendix. The buyer strategy (for on and o¤-path o¤ers) is described in the last paragraph of the proof. If the seller makes an o¤-equilibrium path o¤er, the inductive proof shows that the continuation strategy is unique and depends only on the cuto¤ type that accepts that o¤-path o¤er.
3 Limit of Equilibria as ! 0:
We now take the limit of the equilibria described in the previous section as ! 0: We show that the limit expressions are much simpler. While much of the previous literature refers to as the "bargaining friction" we prefer to refer to it as measure of the seller's ability to commit to the current o¤er.
Note that a¤ects equilibrium strategies only via its e¤ect on t : The di¤erence equation for t ; (7) ; converges to a simple di¤erential equation as ! 0; with a boundary condition T which does not depend on : The solution of that di¤erential equation is t = e r(T t)
T : That allows us to obtain the following characterization of the continuous-limit of equilibria: 20 Proposition 2 As ! 0 :
As we discussed in the Introduction, for the case = = 0 (ii) appears in Ausubel and Deneckere (1992) and when in addition a = 1 Guth and Ritzberger (1998) obtain (i). Beyond being more tractable, the limiting expressions have clear economic interpretation.
Consider …rst the value for the seller. V (k; T t) is simply what she would get from just waiting and making the last o¤er. 21 This implies that the seller's value is driven down to her outside option of simply waiting to make her last o¤er. The uninformed party cannot capture more than her reservation value once her ability to commit to an o¤er disappears. 22 Second, the equilibrium prices display a no-regret property: the seller is indi¤erent between collecting P (k; T t) from type k today or getting what this type would contribute to her value upon reaching the deadline, e r(T t) P (k; 0).
is a bit more complicated but it is a solution to an intuitive di¤erential equation. It follows from taking the continuous time limit of the buyers best response condition given in (5) :
where P k and P t are the derivatives of P (k; T t) (from (ii)) with respect to k and t, respectively. The RHS represents the change in price that results from the horizon getting closer and the seller updating her beliefs downwards. The LHS captures the costs of delay for the buyer in terms of interest lost on the pro…t. Solving (8) with a boundary condition
In Figure 1 we illustrate the equilibrium path of cuto¤ types and prices over time. 23 As described in Proposition 2, trade takes place smoothly over time except for the last instant before the deadline; at this point there is an atom of trade m (T ) : In the plotted example the "deadline e¤ect" includes approximately types between 0.6 and 0.4. Despite this last 21 Even though this is not what she actually does in equilibrium. 22 This is similar to the result in Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2010) , which is a stationary bargaining problem with outside options that arrive stochastically over time. 23 The parameters used are T = 1; r = 10%; a = 1; = = Time to the Deadline T .
Next we look at how the time to the deadline a¤ects the seller's payo¤ and the terms of trade. We also consider the limit as we push the deadline towards in…nity to allow for the model to approach the no deadline models of FLT and GSW.
Proposition 3 For every k > 0 and t T; V (k; T t) and P (k; T t) are decreasing in
rT and go to 0 uniformly as rT ! 1: The probability of agreement is increasing in rT and goes to 1 as rT ! 1: K (t; T t) and the last atom m (T ) are decreasing in rT and go to 0 as rT ! 1:
Proof. Follows from the characterization of the equilibrium objects and the fact that t is decreasing in rT and for any …nite t (and in particular for t = 0) lim rT !1 t = 0:
Corollary 2 (i) (Delay): For all 0 < rT < 1 the expected time to trade is strictly positive.
(ii) (Coase conjecture): As rT ! 1; the expected time to trade and transaction prices converge to 0 for all types (i.e. (v) ! 0 pointwise for all v > 0 and P (k; T t) ! 0 pointwise for all k > 0 and t).
to be no delay in equilibrium the transaction prices for all types have to be close to zero, implying a seller's payo¤ close to zero, in particular, less than e rT V (k; 0) > 0: But that leads to a contradiction since the seller can guarantee himself that by just waiting for the last period. This indirect proof establishes that trade is necessarily ine¢ cient for any equilibrium not only for our family of distributions, but for any distribution without a gap. 24 Part (ii) shows that our limit of equilibria converges to the equilibria in GSW and FLT:
as we make the horizon very long (convergence of the model) trade takes place immediately and the buyer captures the entire surplus (convergence of equilibrium outcome). Note that ST had established that the same holds when one reverses the order of limits, …rst taking the limit as T ! 1 (the FLT and GSW models) and then ! 0. Actually, like a lot of the previous literature, ST use a per period discount rate = e r and take the limit as ! 1:
In the …nite horizon case it actually matters if ! 1 as a result of ! 0 or r ! 0: The latter would make the whole game essentially a static game since rT ! 0:
When Deadlines Matter?
The previous proposition established that for large rT the equilibrium outcome converges to the Coasian outcome in a game without deadlines. To illustrate for which deadlines the equilibrium is far from that deadline, in Figure 2 we plot the seller's value at time zero (solid) and the initial price demanded (dashed) for the uniform (a = 1) case for = = :25. As we can see from the plot, as the (normalized) horizon until the deadline extends we converge to the Coasian results, initial prices and seller's value are very close to 0; for rT > 1; but substantially away from the Coase conjecture for rT < 0:2: Figure 3 graphs the probability of agreement (solid) and atom size (dots) and percentage of trades that take place at the deadline (dashed): The plot illustrates that although for short horizons most of the trade takes place in the last o¤er, as the horizon increases this changes.
Furthermore, when rT is greater than one, trade takes place with very high probability and it mostly takes place before the deadline.
In summary, in these examples, if the discount rate is between 10% and 20%, the deadlines would have to be over 1-2 years not to matter. For many of the practical applications of 
Deterministic vs. Stochastic Deadlines.
It is worth noting that it is quite di¤erent if we face a …xed deadline date rather than a stochastic deadline that arrives at a Poisson rate after which the opportunity to trade disappears, even if from time zero perspective the expected time available to reach an agreement is the same ( 1 = T ). This di¤erence arises because knowing that the game ends at T allows the seller to make a credible last take it or leave it o¤er at T: This possibility allows him to extract a positive amount of surplus. Instead, a stochastic loss of the opportunity of trade that arrives as a surprise is equivalent to having a higher discount rater = r + and would lead to immediate trade with the buyer capturing the entire surplus. This is a di¤erence between our model and that discussed in Hart (1989) .
If we instead allowed the seller to make a last take it or leave it o¤er when the stochastic deadline materialized, the outcome would be much closer (but not the same) to what we would obtain with a deterministic deadline. In fact, the seller would prefer the stochastic deadline. In this case her value would be +r V (1; 0) instead of e r V (1; 0) and +r > e r :
This follows simply because the present value of a dollar is a convex function of the time at which it is generated. Therefore, a mean preserving spread increases value.
Heuristic Derivation of the limit
Our proof of Proposition 2 uses the explicit closed form construction of equilibria in discrete time. To obtain this strong characterization we limited our analysis to a family of distributions that has the nice property that any truncation has the same shape as the original distribution. 25 We conjecture that the result is more general, that for any well-behaved f (v), taking a limit of any sequence of PBE of the discrete time games as ! 0; we would get V (k; T t) = e r(T t) V (k; 0) ; P (k; T t) = e r(T t) P (k; 0) and K (t; T t) is a solution to (8) with a boundary condition K (0; T ) = 1: This conjecture is likely to be true if in the limit the equilibria become Markovian (the continuation payo¤s depend on the history only via k and T t) and in the limit there are no atoms of trade before T: In that case, heuristically the seller's best response problem would be to choose the speed with which to skim buyer types, _ K and the value of that strategy would be:
If an interior _ K is optimal in the limit 26 , then because the RHS is linear in _ K; it must be that the coe¢ cients on _ K add up to zero:
If that is satis…ed then all terms with _ K drop out of (9) and we get:
Together with the boundary condition V (k; 0) ; this di¤erential equation has a unique solution V (k; T t) = e r(T t) V (k; 0) ; the seller value at any moment of the game and after any history is equal to the value of the outside option of waiting for the deadline. Finally, plugging it into (10) we get P (k; T t) = e r(T t) P (k; 0) as claimed (note that by the envelope theorem,
The economic intuition behind this heuristic reasoning is that prices higher than e r(T t) P (k; 0) would make the seller want to speed up trade, while prices lower than that would make him want to stop it and wait. The Coase conjecture forces manifest themselves in the linearity of the limit objective function (9) in _ K:
Generalizing the Deadline E¤ect.
Conditional on reaching the deadline, as long as there are strict gains from trade (i.e.
passing the deadline has a discrete cost), there will be a mass of trade at the deadline. This holds for general distributions, F (v) ; and more general disagreement payo¤s than we study.
This claim can be proven using static analysis.
In what situations would we reach the deadline? is not too high, for small enough T the deadline would be reached and then we conjecture that the equilibrium path would be the same as in our limit (although the o¤-equilibrium path would be di¤erent than in our heuristic derivation).
As discussed at the beginning of this sub-section, we conjecture that in the no-gap case with costly deadline-missing, it should hold for any F (v) that in the (limit) equilibrium there is smooth trade before T and an atom of trade at the eleventh hour. While we …nd it intuitive, it turns out that proving this conjecture is much harder for general distributions. While it is easy to prove that the probability to trade n periods before deadline T converges pointwise for every n to zero as ! 0 (since otherwise the price would decrease discontinuously at T ); this is not su¢ cient to prove that there would be no atoms of trade in the limit. First, as ! 0; the number of periods in the game grows to in…nity and hence pointwise convergence is not su¢ cient. Second, even if we could prove that the probability of trade goes to zero uniformly for all k 2 1; :::; T , it would not be enough since if that probability goes to zero at a rate slower than over a range of periods, the limit K (t; T t) could be discontinuous. 27 One of the di¢ culties is that for a general F (v) the seller's maximization problem may have multiple solutions in some periods. That makes it hard to prove uniqueness of the equilibrium limit and its properties and in particular establishing rates of convergence (and would require more complex methods than our current analysis). 27 Similarly, if the probability of trade in a given period goes to zero over at a rate faster than over a range of times, then in the limit K (t; T t) could be constant over a range of time, unlike in our equilibria.
In this section we analyze how the deadline e¤ect and division of surplus depend on the disagreement payo¤s and : For this analysis it is useful to also de…ne a conditional atom, (T; 0) ; i.e. the probability of trade at the deadline conditional on reaching it (as opposed to m (T ) which is from the ex-ante perspective). Given our distributional assumption, it has a very simple form:
We start with the following general results about the probability of trade and the deadline e¤ect:
Proposition 4 (i) The fraction of negotiations that reach agreement conditional on reaching the deadline (the conditional atom), is decreasing in and . If + is held …xed, it is also decreasing in = :
(ii) The unconditional probability that agreement is reached at the deadline (m (T )) is decreasing in ; it is also decreasing in for small rT: If + is held …xed, it also decreasing in = :
(iii) The overall probability of agreement is decreasing in ; it is also decreasing in for small rT: If + is held …xed, it also decreasing in = :
(iv) If rT is su¢ ciently small the fraction of all agreements that take place at the deadline is decreasing in and : If + is …xed, the fraction is increasing in = :
The proof is by direct manipulation of the expressions we obtained above.
In words, the bleaker the prospects if they do not reach an agreement (a lower or ) the more likely they will reach one, as one would expect from a static model. More interestingly, the bleaker are the prospects, proportionally more of the trade takes place in the last instant when it is clear that not agreeing would be bad for both. At the same time, if we keep the ine¢ ciency of disagreement …xed, the stronger the seller's position, there are fewer agreements (intuition: the seller su¤ers from less adverse selection if he waits past deadline and if is higher, waiting is less costly) and they are more likely to happen right at the deadline.
Studying the incidence of strikes from Canadian data Gunderson, Kervin and Reid (1986) …nd that strikes are more likely to occur (passing T ) when the cost of not reaching an agreement by the strike date are lower (higher and ).
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To assess how small is "small enough" in the proposition we have performed several numerical computations. For example, in the uniform distribution case, a = 1; if we let = 1 2 then as prospects get bleaker a larger fraction of agreements happen at the deadline even for rT = 1: In Figure 4 we graph the probability of agreement (solid) and atom size (dotted) and the percentage of agreements at T (dashed) for a = 1; = ; r = 10% and T = 1: Beyond the probability of trade, one may be also interested in how and a¤ect equilibrium prices and payo¤s:
Proposition 5 (i) For every t; V (k; T t), P (k; T t) and K (t; T t) increase in and decrease in : If ( + ) is kept …xed they increase in = .
(ii) The equilibrium price in each moment t increases in and decreases in :
Proof. (i) is obtained by direct inspection of the limit equilibrium and the monotonicity of T : (ii) combines higher prices for each type at t and that the cuto¤ is higher (and prices increase in k):
Summarizing, as the seller's disagreement situation improves, she obtains higher payo¤ in equilibrium and sets higher prices to all types and over time. The opposite is true if the buyer's disagreement payo¤ improves.
One way to relate our results to the data for the …rms (buyers) bargaining with the unions (sellers) is to think of = as a function of the unemployment rate. When unemployment is higher the …rm could have an easier time replacing workers and workers a harder time …nding new employment so that is higher and is lower. Thus we would expect that when bargaining their yearly contracts unions would settle for worse terms and there would a lower likelihood of not reaching an agreement (going on strike) when the unemployment rate is higher. Capturing this e¤ect in the data is not simple since the unemployment rate is not independent of the distribution of …rm pro…tability, captured by a. 29 
Two benchmark cases
We now discuss two benchmark cases.
Information Revealed at T
Suppose that at time T the private information is revealed and hence there can be e¢ cient trade i.e. + = 1: In this case the equilibrium has some interesting properties. First, there is no longer an atom of trade in the last instant before the deadline. This is simply a manifestation of the no trade theorem. The buyer will not be willing to accept any price lower than (1 ) k; on the other hand the seller would not want to o¤er any price lower than this since the next instant she expects to get that amount. Before the last instant there will be trade since there is a cost of waiting until the deadline and hence the highest-type buyer and seller can …nd mutually bene…cial terms of trade. Second, when + = 1; T is independent of the distribution of types (to verify, see that T in Proposition 1 becomes independent of a). As a result, the equilibrium price and acceptance strategies are also independent of the distribution of types. We obtain the following comparative statics in this benchmark case:
Proposition 6 Suppose + = 1: T hen; V (k; T t) ; K (t; T t) and P (k; T t) are increasing in and for every t 0: The probability trade takes place before T is decreasing in :
Proof. Follows from noting that when + = 1 we have that T = : Using this fact some simple computations lead to the results. The loss of e¢ ciency follows because K (t; T t) increasing in implies that trade is slower for larger (and since there is no atom of trade at T; more types trade after the information is revealed). The ine¢ ciency arises from the discounting cost of delayed trade.
In addition to trading later, buyers also su¤er from paying higher prices.
Finally, we can say how the distribution parameter a a¤ects prices and payo¤s:
Proposition 7 Suppose + = 1: T hen; V (k; T t) and expected transaction prices are increasing in a: Expected time to trade is decreasing in a:
Proof. Since the equilibrium price and acceptance strategies are independent of the distribution of types, the only e¤ect of a higher a is that there are relatively more high types and since trade happens sooner and at higher prices with these types, the result follows.
Note that for a …xed buyer type v di¤erences in a would have no impact on its outcome. This is only true in the extreme with no e¢ ciency loss upon reaching T . More generally, strategies do depend on a; a …xed buyer type would then face di¤erent outcomes when a is high than when it is low.
30 30 See Proposition 8 below which looks at the e¤ect of changes in the distribution for the case = = 0.
Lost Opportunity of Trade at T
Now consider the benchmark case = = 0: That is, if players do not reach an agreement the potential surplus from doing business is lost forever. In this case:
which is increasing in a: That implies the following comparative statics results:
Proposition 8 Suppose = = 0. T hen; V (k; T t) ; K (t; T t) and P (k; T t) are increasing in a:
Note that this implies for example that a …rm of a …xed type (pro…tability) v is less likely to reach an agreement with the unions when the overall economy is stronger (higher a) than when the economy is in a recession. As stated by Kennan and Wilson (1989) , although hard to obtain in a model, this is consistent with some of the empirical studies on strikes: "Other aspects of the incidence and duration of strikes pose particularly dif…cult challenges. There is a well-established body of evidence (summarized in Kennan, 1986) , showing that there are more strikes in good economic times than in bad times, and S. Vroman (1989) and Gunderson et al. (1986) have recently sharpened this result for US and Canadian data respectively, showing that the incidence of contract strikes is also procyclical."
Admittedly, comparative statics with respect to a are only one of the ways to capture changes in the environment, but it points out that the model is capable of matching complicated patterns in the data. To take it seriously to the data we think it would be necessary to enrich the model with the institutional details of a particular market, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
E¢ ciency Comparisons
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One might wonder if the threat of an unattractive outcome upon reaching the deadline, for example automatic budget cuts as in the recent budget negotiations, would lead to more e¢ cient or ine¢ cient outcomes. In Figure 5 we plot the expected total surplus S ( ; ) for various combinations of and as a function of how long the deadline is, rT: All computations are for a = 1 (buyer types distributed uniformly). 31 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting material in this section. The …rst-best surplus in this case is 1 2 (immediate trade for all types) and this value is attained with S (0; 1) for any trading horizon rT (as stated in Corollary 3):
In the benchmark case of no ine¢ ciency at the deadline, + = 1; as we increase ; the total surplus decreases for any horizon, as stated in Corollary 4. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the e¤ect of the deadline is non-monotonic in this case. The intuition is that for very short horizons the deadline is reached very frequently but full e¢ ciency is attained at that ; capture expected surplus 1 4 with a corresponding buyer surplus equal to 1 8 -the curve for S (0; 0) starts at this surplus of 3 8 : Hence, for short horizons, the overall e¢ ciency is higher if passing the deadline does not create discrete loss of surplus, + = 1. For longer bargaining horizons and if the seller's share upon reaching the deadline is greater than 1 2 we can get the opposite ranking: as seen in this graph, for some rT; S (0; 0) > S ( ; 1 ) :
Another natural question regarding overall e¢ ciency of the bargaining equilibrium is how it is a¤ected by the frequency of o¤ers, as measured by . It turns out that the answer is not straightforward because it depends on the surplus upon reaching the deadline ( ; ), the horizon length (rT ) and the distribution of types. 32 Complete analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, but we illustrate possible answers by comparing the extreme case of 32 For similar questions on how frequency of o¤ers a¤ects surplus, recall that the Coase conjecture literature with in…nite horizon points out that small are better for e¢ ciency. Similar questions have been asked in Chen (2012) who studies name your own price auctions and Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2012) who study dynamic markets for lemons. and infrequent o¤ers yield approximately the one-shot monopolist outcome 3 8 . When the deadline is very short, and hence very likely to be reached, the overall e¢ ciency is driven by the loss of surplus from not reaching an agreement ( + = 1 vs. = 0). Note that for = 1 the ranking of surplus for ! 0 and = T depends on T and numerical calculations show that the same is true for many other levels of and : Hence, the that maximizes overall e¢ ciency depends on the length of the horizon and other parameters of the model. As a result, sometimes the need for the labor union representatives to get time-consuming response from the union members may improve not only their own payo¤ but overall e¢ ciency as well.
Conclusions
With a parsimonious model that builds on the previous literature we have captured the e¤ects of deadlines on bargaining environments with one sided asymmetric information. The most salient of the equilibrium features is the mass of agreements that take place at the "eleventh hour". This is very much in line with the existing empirical and experimental data.
Our model predicts how post-deadline payo¤s a¤ect the division of surplus and the timing of agreements. The possibility to characterize the limit of equilibria in closed form and to perform additional comparative statics analysis opens the door to revisit some of the experimental data and suggests interesting avenues for future empirical tests.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is by induction and is similar to the one in ST. At time T from equation (6) we get the buyer will not accept any price higher than (1 ) k.
Hence, the last price solves: (p; T t; ) p = e r ( (p; T t; ) P ( ; T (t + ) ; ))
is the buyer's best response (necessary) condition.
In order to complete the proof by induction, assume that for all : The proposition does not specify the buyer's strategy, but it can be derived from the seller's strategy. Given any price p at time t (on or o¤ the equilibrium path) the cuto¤ type accepting this price is the unique solution to:
so that (p; T t; ) = p 1 e r +e r t :
